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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DUAL USE RESEARCH POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
CAROLE R. BASKIN* AND TODD J. RICHARDSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 2013, the U.S. Government released two proposed
policy documents: the U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (Oversight Policy)1 and the
Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are
Transmissible among Mammals by Respiratory Droplets (H5N1 Funding
Framework Policy).2 These documents were published almost a year after
the U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern was released on March 29, 2012 (DURC Policy) and
were meant to provide guidance for research institutions on implementation
of the DURC Policy.3 In the proposed policies, the U.S. Government is not
prescriptive regarding entities within research institutions that should be
responsible for implementation of this oversight. For many, however, the
logical choice is the already overextended Institutional Biosafety Committees
(IBCs),4 in part because IBCs are federally mandated to provide review for

* Carole R. Baskin, D.V.M., MSc, CPIA, Institute for Biosecurity & Department of
Environmental & Occupational Health, College for Public Health & Social Justice, Saint Louis
University, St. Louis, Missouri; Department of Comparative Medicine, University of
Washington, Seattle, Washington.
** Todd J. Richardson, Ph.D., Office of Research Integrity, Saint Louis University, St. Louis,
Missouri.
1. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-70 (proposed Feb. 22, 2013).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING FUNDING DECISIONS
ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN
INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT ARE TRANSMISSIBLE AMONG MAMMALS BY RESPIRATORY DROPLETS
(2013), http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf.
3. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12370.
4. Letter from David A. Relman, M.D., FIDSA President, Infectious Diseases S. of Am., to
Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy 2 (Apr. 23, 2013) (on file
with authors).
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research involving “recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules,”5 and
at least some of this research will involve such agents. Further, most
institutions have tasked IBCs with oversight of all research-related activities
with potential biohazards beyond their original mandate.6 Review at the
institutional level of research with dual use potential may also involve export
control compliance.
Consistently, comments on the proposed policies expressed anxiety over
logistics, costs, and compliance, particularly when it came to restricting the
flow of scientific information.7 As for compliance, the burden placed on
Principal Investigators (PIs) to determine and remain vigilant throughout the
research cycle about the potential for dual use of their research seemed
unrealistic since most PIs were never trained or conditioned to make such
determinations, and this emphasis on PIs raised concerns about how blame
would be placed if, in fact, an incident happened.8 There were also
questions as to whether the Oversight Policy applied to only whole versions
of the listed organisms or to subcomponents as well,9 and whether it should
apply to other organisms or other types of life sciences research.10 Concerns
were also expressed regarding how resource-intensive the institutional role
would become, and whether the DURC Policy should be expanded into a
broader class of experiments or agents.11 Since organisms thus far listed in
the DURC Policy are all Select Agents,12 the additional scrutiny might be
unnecessary to begin with.13 Concerns were expressed regarding how
institutions would handle requests for actual assessment documents made
5. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT OR
SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES (2013).
6. See Letter from David Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Letter from Judith S. Bond, President, Fed’n of Am. Soc’ys for Experimental Biology, to
Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy (Apr. 12, 2013) (on file with
authors).
8. Letter from Samuel Evans, Visiting Professor & Academic Coordinator, Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy (Apr. 23, 2013)
(on file with authors).
9. Letter from Alan I. Leshner, Chief Executive Officer & Executive Publisher, Am. Ass’n
for the Advancement of Sci., to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director, Office of Sci. & Tech.
Policy (Apr. 17, 2013) (on file with authors).
10. Letter from Samuel Evans to Franca Jones, supra note 8. See also Letter from David
Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 2 (recommending a focus not on a specific set of
pathogens but to focus “oversight on the seven identified categories of experiments”); Carrie
D. Wolinetz, Implementing the New U.S. Dual-Use Policy, 336 SCI. 1525, 1526 (2012).
11. Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Association of Am. Univs. and Anthony P.
DeCrappeo, President, Council on Gov’t Relations, to Franca R. Jones, Assistant Director,
Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy 1 (Apr. 23, 2013) (on file with authors).
12. 42 C.F.R. § 73.3 (2013); 7 C.F.R. § 331.3 (2013); 9 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2013).
13. David Malakoff & Martin Enserink, New U.S. Rules Increase Oversight of H5N1
Studies, Other Risky Science, 339 SCI. 1025, 1025 (2013); Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1526.
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under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and sunshine laws in certain
states.14 Finally, questions arose regarding the transparency of funding
decisions and whether there would be an appeals process.15 It was also
suggested that there was a need for an appeals process at the institutional
level regarding classification of research prior to submission to the funding
agency.16 In conclusion, additional guidance, clarification, and training
materials all seem critical in order to move forward.
The H5N1 Funding Framework Policy requires additional review at the
funding agency level for proposals anticipating to generate Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses transmissible among
mammals by respiratory droplets, which could add to the already protracted
review process by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and ultimately
discourage researchers from attempting certain experiments that could be
beneficial from a public health point of view.17
Despite these widespread concerns over the new and proposed policies,
certain advocates for stricter biosecurity oversight feel that the new
requirements are still not stringent enough.18
II. HISTORY OF OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE RESEARCH
The concept of dual use research is not new, and in the past, the
scientific community has demonstrated its ability to self-regulate when it
came to responsible development of new technologies. After the Asilomar
Conference in 1975, scientists designed and followed a set of guidelines for
work with recombinant DNA, then a novel technology of unexplored
potential.19 This led to the publication of the NIH Guidelines for Research
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules.20 Later, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and NIH collaborated on the Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL).21 These two
documents have been highly successful in protecting individual

14. Letter from Alan I. Leshner to Franca Jones, supra note 9.
15. Id.; Letter from Hunter Rawlings and Anthony P. DeCrappeo to Franca Jones, supra
note 11, at 2-3.
16. Letter from Hunter Rawlings and Anthony P. DeCrappeo to Franca Jones, supra note
11, at 4.
17. See Letter from David Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 1; Wolinetz, supra
note 10, at 1526.
18. Malakoff & Enserink, supra note 13, at 1025.
19. COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 30 (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT].
20. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra, note 5.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 3-4 (5th ed. 2009).
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biotechnology workers and the public. However, in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, letters containing anthrax bacteria were
mailed to several news media offices and to two U.S. Senators, killing five
people and sickening seventeen others.22 Less than one year later, two
pieces of legislation were signed into law: The Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of October 2001, (Patriot Act)23 and The Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
(Bioterrorism Response Act).24 These laws regulated who, for what purpose,
and in what circumstances individuals could possess and transfer any
biological agent, specifically addressing a list of restricted agents known as
Select Agents, a term coined at the time the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted.25
Subsequent to the 2001 and 2002 legislations, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) developed the Select Agents Regulations.26 Another consequence of
these events was the infusion of billions of dollars into infectious disease
research, which, perhaps ironically, encouraged and increased the study of
Select Agents by researchers.27
While they provided the official impetus for these new legislations, the
events of September 2001 alone did not raise awareness of the potential for
misuse of biotechnology. Although bioweapons had been used since
antiquity, only earlier that year, a pest control experiment conducted by an
Australian researcher reminded the scientific community and the public of
the inherent dangers of life sciences research.28 In an attempt to render

22. JEANNE GUILLEMIN, AMERICAN ANTHRAX: FEAR, CRIME, AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
NATION’S DEADLIEST BIOTERROR ATTACK, xx-xxi (Henry Holt & Co. 2011).
23. Uniting and Strenghtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (codified in various sections of the United States Code).
24. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
25. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511,
110 Stat. 1214, 1284. See also About Us, NAT’L SELECT AGENT REGISTRY, ANIMAL & PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV. & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.select
agents.gov/AboutUS.html (last updated June 11, 2013).
26. 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2012); 9 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2012); 42 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2012).
27. Jerry Jaax, Administrative Issues Related to Infectious Disease Research in the Age of
Bioterrorism, 46 INST. FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL RES. J. 8, 8-9 (2005). See Public Health
Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 125,
116 Stat. 614.
28. See Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. OF VIROLOGY 1205 (2001).
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female mice sterile by having them mount an immune response against their
own eggs, researchers used the mousepox virus as a delivery system for the
self-antigens.29 Unfortunately, the recombinant virus, which also carried
immune-modulatory genes, depressed rather than stimulated the immune
response of the mice to the mousepox virus, which subsequently died, even
if they had been vaccinated and even if the mice used were of a mousepoxresist.30 This raised concerns that if similar modifications were made to the
smallpox virus, the vaccine could become ineffective.31
In 2002, Dr. Eckard Wimmer, a German American virologist,
synthesized the full genome of the poliovirus and used it to produce
infectious polioviruses de novo, raising concerns that individuals who may
not have otherwise access to them could use similar techniques to produce
more dangerous organisms.32 Finally, also in 2002, it was found that
genetic manipulations of the vaccinia virus, normally relatively harmless to
humans, but a close relative of the virus causing smallpox, could perhaps
render vaccinia as virulent as smallpox.33 Due to these and similar
instances, the research community became engaged in a debate on how to
deal with life sciences research with potential for dual use.34
In 2004, the National Research Council’s Committee on Research
Standards & Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of
Biotechnology published a report entitled, Biotechnology Research in An Age
of Terrorism: Confronting The “Dual Use” Dilemma (Fink Report).35 The
recommendations of the Fink Report included an enhanced oversight
system, initially based on current legislation, for seven types of “Experiments
of Concern,” which would be those that:
(1) Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
(2) Would confer resistance to antibiotics or antivirals.
(3) Would enhance a pathogen's virulence or render a non-pathogen
virulent.
(4) Would increase a pathogen's transmissibility.
(5) Would alter a pathogen's host range.

29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
Id. at 1208.
See id.
Eckard Wimmer, The Test-tube Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus, 7 EUR.
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S3, S8 (2006).
33. Ariella M. Rosengard et al., Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of a
Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement, 99 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI. 8808,
8808 (2002).
34. Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1525.
35. See FINK REPORT, supra note 19.
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(6) Would enable evasion of diagnostic tests.
(7) Would enable weaponization of pathogens and toxins.36
At the publication stage, this oversight would rely on self-governance of
scientists and scientific journals.37 Other recommendations focused on the
need for education of the scientific community about the potential for the
dual use of certain research endeavors and its moral responsibility to help
mitigate these risks.38 It also advocated for better communication channels
internationally, as well as between the scientific community and law
enforcement agencies.39 Most significantly, the Fink Report advised the
creation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSAAB) by
HHS to provide guidance and leadership for oversight of research with dual
use potential.40
As suggested by the Fink Report, NSABB was soon established and had
its first meeting in 2005.41 Its current role is to advise the U.S. Government
on how to minimize the risk from:
[R]esearch that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably
anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be
directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety,
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or material,
defined as ‘Dual Research of Concern’ or ‘DURC.’42

The threshold for being DURC takes into account scope (breadth of
consequences) and immediacy (whether results can be directly misapplied)
of potential threat. NSABB is staffed with subject matter experts from
scientific
and
security
communities –– ex
officio
government
representatives.43 NSABB has several working groups including:
international
engagement,
synthetic
genomics,
culture
of
responsibility/personnel reliability, code of conduct, communications, dual
use criteria, and an ad hoc H5N1 working group.44 These groups have
helped publish background and educational material on the Office of
Biotechnology’s website that is aligned with the mission of NSABB.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 113, 114-15.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 113-15.
Id. at 111.
FINK REPORT, supra note 19, at 123.
Dana A. Shea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33342 OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY 2, 4 (2007).
42. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity – Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L.
INSTS. OF HEALTH, OFF. OF BIOTECH. ACTIVITIES, http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/faqs/NSABB_
FAQs_NEW_FINAL.pdf (last viewed Oct. 16, 2013).
43. Shea, supra note 41, at 3.
44. Id. at 3-4.
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Before NSABB had its first meeting, a controversial manuscript was
published describing how a minute quantity of butolinum toxin dispersed at
one dairy plant could kill 400,000 people.45 With NSABB not yet
operational, the author of the manuscript and the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) resisted pressure from HHS not to
publish it.46 PNAS’s rationale was that the public should be aware of the
danger and that free and open scientific inquiry ultimately makes the public
safer.47 The author later stated that he would have welcomed the advice of
NSABB had it been provided at that time.48
In September of 2005, there was a closed NSABB session to consider
the publication of manuscripts about the reconstructed 1918 influenza
virus,49 which was subsequently added to the list of Select Agents.50 The
1918 pandemic flu caused up to 50 million deaths worldwide, but since
viruses of the same sub-type had been in circulation since, it was believed
that the vast majority of the world population would have sufficient crossimmunity to fight the 1918 virus.51 Of note, this belief was challenged
during the time of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (swine flu), although it was later
demonstrated that the vaccine against swine flu would likely be protective
against the 1918 pandemic flu.52 After considering the significance of the
information to the scientific community and public health, the risk of the
information being misused, the benefits of communicating the information,
and the consequences of restricting the information so that the public would
not have access to it, NSABB recommended the publication of the
manuscripts with some modifications that would emphasize the public health
benefits of the research and the precautions that were taken during the

45. See Lawrence M. Wein & Yifan Liu, Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply:
The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, 102 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI. 9984, 9985,
9987 (2005) (discussing the controversial manuscript by authors Lawrence Wein & Yifan Liu).
46. Bruce Alberts, Modeling Attacks on the Food Supply, 102 PROC. OF THE NAT’L. ACAD.
OF SCI. 9937, 9937 (2005) (editorial from the President of the National Academy of
Sciences).
47. Meeting Minutes, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Summary of Second NSABB
Meeting 15 (Nov. 21, 2005) (on file with the Office of Biotechnology Activities).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 42 C.F.R. § 73.3(b) (2012).
51. Letter from Michael T. Osterholm, Dir., Minn. Ctr. of Excellence for Influenza
Research and Surveillance to Amy P. Patterson, Assoc. Dir. for Sci. Policy, Nat’l. Insts. of
Health 6 (Apr. 12, 2012).
52. Rafael A. Medina et al., Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Vaccine Protects Against 1918
Spanish Influenza Virus, NATURE COMMC’NS, June 15, 2010, at 1, 2, http://www.nature.com/
ncomms/journal/v1/n3/full/ncomms1026.html.
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research to protect the researchers and the public.53 This example set an
informal precedent for the deliberations that took place regarding the
publication of two manuscripts discussing the making of mammalianaerosol transmissible HPAI viruses of the H5N1-subtype six years later,
which ultimately triggered the enactment of the U.S. Government policies
discussed herein.54 Of note, HPAI had never been known to be transmissible
between mammals, except inefficiently in a close contact ferret model.55 The
studies led by Dr. Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., at Erasmus Medical Center in
Rotterdam, Netherlands, and Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, were first presented at the European
Scientific Working Group on Influenza in Malta in September 2011.56 Not
surprisingly, the research attracted a lot of attention, and in November
2011, NSABB met to debate whether two resulting manuscripts submitted to
Science and Nature should be published.57 “After deliberating amongst
themselves and talking with both papers’ lead authors, the 23 NSABB
members voted unanimously to recommend the two journals redact key
parts of the manuscripts, allowing the sensitive portions to be made
available to researchers only on a need-to-know basis.”58 “Although under
no legal obligation to do so, the journals and researchers agreed….59”
However, “Science stipulated that the U.S. government would need to
provide a ‘written, transparent plan’ for making the redacted information
available for ‘all those responsible scientists who request it’ as part of their
work.”60
By December 2011, the controversy became public knowledge, and a
heated debate ensued “across the Internet, in the media, and at
conferences” about the appropriateness and communication of the

53. Meeting Minutes, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Summary of Second NSABB
Meeting 15 (Nov. 21, 2005) (on file with the Office of Biotechnology Activities).
54. See, e.g., Michael T. Osterholm & David A. Relman, Creating a MammalianTransmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus: Social Contracts, Prudence, and Alternative
Perspectives, 205 J. INFECT. DIS. 1636, 1636 (2012).
55. Amy P. Patterson et al., A Framework for Decisions about Research with HPAI H5NI
Viruses, 339 SCI. 1036, 1036 (2013); Hui-Ling Yen et al., Ineffcient Transmission of H5N1
Infuenza Viruses in a Ferret Contact Model, 81 J. VIROLOGY 6890, 6897 (2007).
56. INFLUENZA TIMES, European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), Malta, Sep.
11-14, 2011, http://labs.fhcrc.org/cbf/Papers/H5N1_docs/FEIC_news_from_Malta.pdf.
57. See Press Release, Nat’l Institutes of Health, NSABB Review of H5N1 Research (Dec.
20, 2011) (on file with authors).
58. Wendee Holtcamp, One Study, Two Paths The Challenge of Dual-Use Research, 120
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A239, A240 (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id. at A240 (quoting Statement by Dr. Bruce Alberts, Editor-in-Chief, Sci., Regarding
Publication of H5N1 Avian Influenza Research, (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.aaas.org/news/
releases/2011/media/1220herfst_statement.pdf).
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researchers’ work, the risks associated with the work, potential partial or
complete censorship of scientific publications, and DURC in general.61 After
NSABB’s decision, “39 influenza researchers, including Dr. Fouchier and
Dr. Kawaoka, voluntarily agreed to a 60-day moratorium on H5N1
research,” which was later informally extended to a year.62 “With the
research moratorium in place and the papers delayed, scientists and public
health officials convened at several international meetings to debate the
dilemma.”63 Then, “a February 2012 meeting convened at the [World
Health Organization] WHO headquarters in Geneva culminated in a letter
signed by 22 scientists and public-health officials from 11 nations calling for
full publication of the H5N1 papers — in contrast to NSABB’s
recommendation” –– after biosecurity and communications issues were
addressed.64 Subsequently, the U.S. Government had NSABB reconsider
their original decision based on the WHO consultation, which yielded more
details about the two studies.65
Dr. Kawaoka66 had not used a full H5N1 virus. He had used one gene
(coding for the hemaglutinin (HA) protein –– a surface receptor) from the
HPAI H5N1 virus out of eight.67 The other seven genes were from the
pandemic 2009 virus, a virus already adapted to humans.68 Out of four
mutations generated in the H5N1 HA gene, three of these were generated
through in vitro, and one of these was generated through live infection in
ferrets, a technique called passaging that was first used by Louis Pasteur in
the nineteenth century.69 Two of these mutations affected receptor specificity
that is critical for transmissibility amongst humans, one affected replication
in the nose, which is also critical for transmissibility by aerosol, and another
affected fusion of viral particles to human cells.70 The resulting virus

61. Id.
62. Id.; Patterson et al., supra note 55, at 1036.
63. Holtcamp, supra note 58, at A240.
64. Id.; WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON TECHNICAL CONSULTATION ON H5N1 RESEARCH
ISSUES (Feb. 16-17, 2012) (on file with authors).
65. Holtcamp, supra note 58, at A240.
66. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Scientist Plays Down Danger of Flu Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2012, at A16.
67. Masaki Imai et al., Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers respiratory
droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets, 486 NATURE 420, 420
(2012).
68. Id. at 423; Yo Han Jang et al., Cold-Adapted Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus
Like Vaccine Elicits Cross-Reactive Immune Responses against Seasonal and H5 Influenza A
Viruses, 86 J. VIROLOGY 5953, 5953 (2012).
69. Imai et al., supra note 67, at 420. See also Louis Pasteur et al., De l’attenuation des
virus et de leur retour a la virulence, 92 LES COMPTES RENDUS DE L’ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES
[C.R. ACAD. SCI.] 430-35 (1881) (Fr.).
70. Id. at 422-24.
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attached to human upper respiratory cells, successfully infected ferrets, and
was transmissible by aerosol between ferrets.71 The infections caused lesions
and weight loss, but no deaths.72 Furthermore, the resulting virus reacted
with the current H5N1 vaccine, which was only made in limited quantities.73
Provided the vaccine would elicit a sufficient immune response, it may be
protective against a virus with this mutated HA gene.74 Of note, there are
currently H5N1 viruses circulating which are only three mutations away from
this version of the H5N1 HA gene.
Dr. Fouchier, on the other end, started with a different, but whole HPAI
H5N1 virus.75 He created five mutations, four in the HA gene, and one in
the PB2 gene, which affects with viral replication.76 Passaging in ferrets
generated two of these mutations.77 The resulting virus attached to human
upper respiratory cells, successfully infected ferrets, and was transmissible by
aerosol between ferrets.78 Again, the infections caused lesions and weight
loss, but no deaths.79 The resulting virus reacted with the current H5N1
vaccine, and was also sensitive to Oseltamivir, an antiviral medication that
considered effective against avian influenza, although some instances of
resistance have already occurred.80 Again, there are currently circulating
H5N1 viruses that are only one mutation away from this version of the
hemaglutinin gene.
It is important to clarify that wild type HPAI H5N1 viruses are lethal in
ferrets as was the mutated virus in Dr. Fouchier’s experiment when he
administered it directly into the trachea, not a natural mode of infection.81
Similarly, intranasal administration of these viruses in their wild type form
causes morbidity and sometimes mortality; however, no mortality was
observed with Dr. Fouchier’s virus when administered in this manner.82 Prior
studies have shown that HPAI H5N1 viruses can be transmitted by direct or
indirect contact exposure, including via respiratory droplets, but the results

71. Id. at 422, 426.
72. Id. at 424, 426-27
73. Id. at 427.
74. Imai et al., supra note 67, at 427.
75. Sander Herfst et al., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between
Ferrets, 336 SCI. 1534, 1536 (2012).
76. Id. at 1539.
77. Id. at 1540.
78. Id. at 1537-40.
79. Herfst et al., supra note 75, at 1540.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. John A. Lednicky et al., Ferrets Develop Fatal Influenza After Inhaling Small Particle
Aerosols of Highly Pathogenic Avain Influenza Virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1), J.
VIROLOGY J. 231, 1 (2010), http://www.virologyj.com/content/7/1/231.
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are inconsistent.83 What sets the two contentious experiments apart is the
fact that the transmissions observed not only occurred efficiently, but by
strictly natural means, such as when ferrets were exposed to the sneezing of
other ferrets infected by experimental means.84 Another essential point is
that the mutations identified in Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s studies,
while yielding similar results, were not identical, and neither were the wild
type viruses which were used as starting points.85 This suggests that different
lineages of HPAI H5N1 viruses and different mutations could yield airbornetransmissible viruses.86
On March 29-30, 2012, NSABB reconsidered its initial decision87 in
light of the additional information suggesting that the research may not have
been as dangerous as initially feared, that it would be of value to
surveillance efforts, and that it had been conducted at an appropriate
biosafety level.88 NSABB voted –– although not unanimously in the case of
Dr. Fouchier’s study –– in favor of publication of both revised papers in
full.89 Another factor in their decision was the lack of an established process
to share the most sensitive information contained in the manuscripts solely
on a “need to know” basis and the wish to avoid the perception that the
U.S. may withhold information critical to HPAI surveillance.90 NSABB
members who still opposed the decision felt that a focus on these particular
viruses and mutations for surveillance would be misguided and that
airborne-transmissible HPAI should only be studied at Biosafety Level (BSL) 4
certified labs/facilities, the highest biosafety level available.91 Interesting to
note, Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s studies were performed only at
enhanced BSL-3 labs/facilities.92 Nonetheless, Dr. Kawoaka’s and Dr.

83. Hui-Ling Yen et al., supra note 55, at 6897.
84. Herfst et al., supra note 75, at 1539; Masaki Imai et al., supra note 67, at 429.
85. Sander Herfst et al., Supplementary Materials for Airborne Transmission of Influenza
A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets, SCI. (June 22, 2012), www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/
336/6088/1534/DC1 (providing supplementary materials for Herfst et al., supra note 75);
Imai et al., supra note 67, at 420-21.
86. MAURA SULLIVAN ET AL., RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS INC., INFLUENZA PANDEMIC RISK THE
CONTRIBUTION OF LABORATORY PATHOGENS TO EXCESS MORTALITY RISK 4 (2013).
87. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MARCH
29-30 at 1 (2012).
88. Id. at 2-3, 5.
89. Id. at 2-3.
90. Id. at 3-4.
91. Id. at 4-5. See also Michael J. Imperlale & Michael G. Hanna, Biosafety
Considerations of Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza, 3 MBIO 1, 1 (2012),
http://mbio.asm.org/content/3/2/e00043-12.
92. Imai et al., supra note 67, at 427.
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Fouchier’s experiments were published in their entirety in May 2012 and
June 2012, respectively.93
While NSABB finalized its deliberations regarding these manuscripts,
HHS released the DURC Policy on March 29, 2012.94 The scope of the
DURC Policy was limited to HPAI H5N1 viruses, the reconstructed 1918
pandemic virus, and Tier 1 Select Agents, which require additional
precautions and training of personnel.95 The DURC was applicable to the
seven categories of experiments of concern originally defined in the Fink
Report.96 The DURC Policy defines responsibilities for federal agencies to
conduct a review of funded projects and devise risk mitigation plans, which
span the entire research life cycle from funding through publication.97 The
responsibilities of the PIs and research institutions are not clearly delineated
in the DURC Policy beyond collaborating on the risk mitigation plan and
implementation, reviewing emerging research findings for DURC, and as the
case may be, notifying the funding agencies.98 After the DURC Policy went
into effect, “NIH conducted a review of its grants and found 381 extramural
and 404 intramural projects [using pathogens or toxins] covered by th[e]
policy.”99 Ten of the extramural projects were designated as DURC,
including seven influenza experiments, and the others used anthrax, plague,
and botulism.100 A mitigation plan was devised in each case.101
This first policy was followed approximately one year later by two
additional and preliminary pieces of legislation; the goal of which was to
provide additional details regarding DURC oversight by research
institutions102 and funding of airborne-transmissible H5N1 HPAI.103 In the
proposed Oversight Policy the roles and responsibilities of the PIs, research
institutions, funding agencies, and U.S. Government were more clearly

93. Herfst et al., supra note 75, at 1534; Imai et al., supra note 67, at 428.
94. Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112 Cong. 7 (2012) (testimony of Anthony Fauci, Director,
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Disease, Nat’l Inst. of Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs.). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY
FOR OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN (2012).
95. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 2-3 (2012). See also 7
C.F.R. § 331 (2012); 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2012); C.F.R. § 73 (2012).
96. FINK REPORT, supra note 19, at 114-15.
97. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 3.
98. Id.
99. FRANK GOTTRON & DANA A. SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42606, PUBLISHING
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS WITH POTENTIAL SECURITY RISKS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14 (2013).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 4.
103. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 2, at 1.
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defined.104 For instance, the Oversight Policy states that PIs should conduct
regular assessments of their work to determine whether it falls under the
scope of the DURC Policy, be knowledgeable and aware of the risks of dual
use research, provide DURC education for their personnel, and be
compliant with institutional and federal policies, as well as with any risk
mitigation plan decided for their projects by funding agencies and their
institution.105 It goes on to state that research institutions should “provide
education and training on DURC,” regularly assess the effectiveness of their
DURC policies, provide an appeal mechanism for affected PIs, and remain
in compliance with federal funding agencies regarding determination of
DURC and “implementation of risk mitigation plan[s].”106 However, the
DURC Policy does not dictate which entity within research institutions will be
responsible for compliance.107 Federal funding agencies should be there as
a resource to PIs and research institutions, but their most important role is to
determine DURC at the funding stage, devise mitigation plans which cover
the entire life cycle of the research from funding through publication, and
respond to reports of non-compliance from research institutions.108 Finally,
the U.S. Government’s role is to develop training and outreach tools and
materials to be used by funding agencies, research institutions, and PIs to
“periodically assess the impact of the DURC policy on life sciences research”
and biosecurity,109 as such assessment could lead to eventual revisions of
the policy.
Regarding mitigation plans, decisions affecting communication of the
research are the most likely to cross into uncharted territory, as they could
call for modification of content (with either addition of contextual
information, or removal of substantive information), timing (publication
could be delayed), or distribution (with restrictions or even classification). In
the proposed H5N1 Funding Framework Policy, an additional two-tiered
(funding agency and department-level) review beyond scientific merit and
DURC is required for projects involving HPAI H5N1 viruses that are
transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets.110 The goal of this
additional step is to ensure that generated viruses could be the result of a
natural evolution process and, therefore, be relevant to real life scenarios,
that adequate safety precautions are set in place, that research stands to

104. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 4 (defining the roles of
various entities in DURC oversight).
105. Id. at 9-10.
106. Id. at 10, 12.
107. See id. at 11.
108. Id. at 13.
109. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93 at, 13, 14.
110. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 2, at 1.
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significantly contribute to public health and biosecurity, and that no viable
alternatives exist to obtain the same answers.111
III. CHALLENGES WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF DUAL USE RESEARCH POLICIES
Comments elicited by the Oversight Policy express significant concerns
regarding the ability of research institutions to achieve and remain in
compliance.112 As noted in the introduction, IBCs, created specifically to
oversee research involving DNA recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules, are already overburdened and underfunded because they also
assume responsibility for oversight of all activities with biohazards, including
compliance with Select Agents Regulations.113 Tasking them with DURC
oversight seems logical and efficient, but may not be practical for some
institutions. IBCs may have to create separate committees or hire outside
entities, which has the potential for a significant slowdown of the research
enterprise that is already besieged with regulations, even if justifiably so. The
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), in
collaboration with the “Association of American Universities (AAU),
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation” held a meeting that focused on sharing best practices of
existing institutional program review and oversight of DURC.114 The fact that
necessary expertise for DURC review may not be available in current IBCs or
within certain institutions increases the chances that consulting with outside
bodies will be necessary. However, the requirement for a mechanism for
review on demand at any time a PI identifies DURC potential115 makes the
involvement of external entities difficult since the university “may have little
control over when the review body is available.”116 Therefore, there is a
possibility that these additional layers of regulations and compliances
ultimately discourage individual researchers and institutions from

111. Id.
112. See generally Letter from Jeffery Miller, President, American Society for Microbiology
et al., to Dr. Franca Jones, Assistant Director, Chemical & Biological Countermeasures, Office
of Sci. & Tech. Policy (Mar. 27, 2013) (noting the need to balance oversight of DURC in order
to “not discourage critical research or place an undue burden on life sciences research
conducted in the United States”). See also United States Gov’t Policy for Institutional Oversight
of Life Sciences Dual Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369 (Feb. 22, 2013).
113. See generally Letter from David Relman to Franca Jones, supra note 4, at 2
(explaining that IBCs are already overextended).
114. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., BRIDGING SCIENCE AND SECURITY FOR
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH: A DISCUSSION ABOUT DUAL USE RESEARCH AND OVERSIGHT AT RESEARCH
INSTITUTIONS 17 (2012).
115. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 11.
116. Letter from Hunter Rawlings and Anthony P. DeCrappeo to Franca Jones, supra note
11, at 2-3.
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undertaking research that would enhance U.S. biosecurity, or they may
simply increase chances of unintentional non-compliance.117
There is also the distinct possibility that DURC regulations, as enacted or
currently proposed, are not sufficient to serve their purpose. As experience
amply demonstrated,118 research with DURC does not necessarily involve
Select Agents or HPAI. Even seemingly innocuous research could have dual
use implications, if not immediately, at some point in the future. One
example is a 1997 study that resulted in the design of a more efficient
delivery system for aerosolized medicines, carrying them deep into the lungs,
with nefarious potential that did not become evident until the anthrax scare
of 2001.119 Another example is in 1943, botany student Arthur Galston
published his thesis on chemicals that were use to hasten the development
of flowering plants.120 Military researchers read and then used Galston’s
findings to develop the defoliant Agent Orange, a chemical that was used in
the Vietnam War and has caused human health problems ever since.121
There are also those agents, which despite being restricted, can be
recovered from the environment or animals in endemic regions, or that can
be made in the laboratory.122 While regulations limit access to these agents
through regular channels, they certainly do not prevent motivated individuals
from acquiring or making them.123 Another issue is that species are not as
well delineated in the microbial world as would be necessary to exclude the
possibility that two different species belong to the same genus.124 The
bottom line is that list-based regulations may be completely insufficient if
they are to prevent misuse of research results.125 It is possible that certain
future federal funding opportunities will focus on dual use research with
acceptance of the funds contingent upon pre-publication review and other

117. Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1526.
118. Roland Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia
Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to
Mousepox, 1205 J. OF VIROLOGY 1205-1210 (2011); Eckard Wimmer, The Test-Tube
Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus, 7 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 53-59 (2006).
119. Wen-I Li & David A. Edwards, Aerosol Particle Transport and Deaggregation
Phenomena in the Mouth and Throat, 26 ADVANCED DRUG DELIVERY REVIEWS 41, 42, 46
(1997).
120. Holtcamp, supra note 58, at A241.
121. Id.
122. Arturo Casadevall & David Relman, Microbial Threat Lists: Obstacles in the Quest for
Biosecurity?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS MICROBIOLOGY 149, 150 (2010).
123. Id. at 150.
124. Id. at 151.
125. See Wolinetz, supra note 10, at 1525 (discussing the insufficiency of list-based
regulations to prevent misuse of research results).
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restrictive measures consistent with the proposed policies.126 It is important
to note that this will not resolve the fact that many projects will still carry the
potential for DURC, even if they are not identified by the funding agency as
such at the beginning of the research cycle or preselected in response to
funding opportunities.
According to the DURC Policy already in place, federal DURC oversight
begins when a project is considered for funding, which may be too late in
some cases considering that much communication about the research takes
place prior to grant submission, including when preliminary experiments are
shared at the occasion of scientific conferences.127 In any event, the U.S.
Government funds only about 31% of the total research and development
efforts in the U.S.128 Research funded by entities other than the U.S.
Government may involve academia, industry (including small start-up
companies), non-profit organizations, contract research organizations, trade
associations, industry consortia, investors, and may be performed in a
variety of settings, even in private homes in the case of self-funded home
experimenters. This leaves many projects flying under the federal radar until
publication, and increases the likelihood of untimely incomplete, or even
unenforceable stopgap measures after the research is already done and the
results disseminated.
Research covered under the new policies requires a considerable need
for self-policing on the part of institutions and PIs, and because of that,
there is much room for error. There is a need for a more bottom-up
approach to complete, or in many cases replace, top-down oversight by the
U.S. Government. Another limitation of relying too much on top-down
oversight is a lack of working relationships and trust between life sciences
research and security communities. Life scientists, unlike their counterparts in
nuclear physics and cryptography, are accustomed to readily sharing, and
in-turn gaining, access to information. However, the flow of information with
security experts is one-directional, although they may use that information to
make decisions regarding enforcement of DURC policies with little or no
input from the scientific community. This culture chasm makes it difficult for
scientists to adjust to the new and still evolving status quo. Yet WHO
reported that both communities needed each other’s expertise to make
effective decisions and policies regarding DURC.129
Good will and cooperation on the part of the scientific community is all
the more critical since the government generally has no authority to classify

126.
127.
128.
129.

GOTTRON & SHEA, supra note 98, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 22.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE WHO INFORMAL CONSULTATION ON DUAL USE
RESEARCH OF CONCERN 7 (2013).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

DUAL USE RESEARCH POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

75

information unless it was produced within a certain pre-agreed framework,
usually in government laboratories or in fulfillment of government
contracts.130 The only two exceptions are information related to nuclear
weapons, which is “born classified,” and information received as part of a
patent application.131 Beyond classification, limiting general access to
research results is new territory, and there is not a mechanism to identify this
information in a timely manner nor an entity that could store and distribute it
according to criteria that does not yet exist. Establishing clear guidelines as
to when information needs to become restricted and what penalties would
follow, if either primary or secondary dissemination occurred, would need to
be articulated and then enforced.
In fact, the DURC Policy geared at limiting the dissemination
(publication) of dual use research contradicts existing federal regulations
and policies related to export controls and fundamental research.132 Both
the Export Administration Regulations133 and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations134 contain exclusions for fundamental research. To qualify as
“fundamental research,” basic and applied science and engineering
research activities must be those ordinarily published and shared broadly
within the scientific community.135 They must also be free from prepublication review, except for determining whether patent rights are being
compromised or proprietary information is being divulged.136 This
“Fundamental Research Exclusion” (FRE) is the primary means by which U.S.
universities engage in research related to dual use technologies without the
need for export control licenses.137 Such licenses are costly and the process
takes considerable time. The cost and time barriers prevent universities from
engaging in export controlled projects without the availability of exclusions
and exemptions. This is especially true in the case of deemed exports, which
essentially make granting access to export-controlled technological
information (not physical items) to a foreign national (person) in the U.S. the
same as if they were in their home country. Such limitations on the free
exchange of ideas and research activities present both practical and
philosophical challenges to universities. In many instances, universities have
130. See 1 S.K. PRASAD, BIOLOGICAL WAR 206 (2009).
131. Id.
132. GOTTRON & SHEA, supra note 98, at 15-16; Mark S. Frankel, Regulating the
Boundaries of Dual-Use Research, 336, SCI. 1523, 1524 (2012).
133. 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (2013).
134. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16 (2012).
135. 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (2013).
136. 15 C.F.R. § 734 (Supp. 1 2013).
137. See CAROL T. CARR, NEGOTIATING THE MINE FIELD: THE CONDUCT OF ACADEMIC
RESEARCH IN COMPLIANCE WITH EXPORT CONTROLS, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. ATT’YS 12
(2006).
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implemented policies and procedures that limit research projects to those
that qualify as fundamental research and/or would otherwise not require
preventing or limiting the involvement of foreign nationals.138 As a result,
most federally funded research conducted on U.S. university campuses is
unrestricted and exempt from export controls.139 Moreover, federal funding
agencies encourage publication and presentation of the research findings.
Prevailing best practice in university export control compliance is oriented
toward seeking out any contract clause or side deal that may prohibit or
limit public dissemination (e.g., pre-publication review) for fear that this
would invalidate the FRE. This is an example of how regulations sometimes
limit the scope of the research enterprise in the U.S.
Several scientific journals have performed pre-publication review of
scientific manuscripts for DURC content voluntarily since 2003. This review
is a response to their own risk analysis rather than that of an external entity,
and their conclusions may differ substantially from those of NSABB or the
U.S. Government. During Dr. Kawaoka’s and Dr. Fouchier’s controversy,
both Science and Nature made it clear that their actions to delay publication
and their considerations of changing the content were completely voluntary
and would not be repeated in the future in similar circumstances.140 Journals
do not have the infrastructure or mechanisms in place to limit the
dissemination of information to a restricted audience beyond withholding
publication or redaction, and doing so goes directly against their primary
purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
The requirement for self-policing at the institutional and individual levels,
combined with presumably heavy financial and possibly legal penalties in
the event of non-compliance, is understandably troublesome to many. In this
regard, DURC policies, as enacted or proposed, differ from those covering
research with recombinant DNA, which is accomplished by a combination
of local self-regulation and limited federal oversight.141 In the event of noncompliance with these guidelines, the penalties are strictly financial at the
individual or institutional level. Non-compliance with DURC policies, on the
other hand, would be more consequential, due in part to the applicability of

138. See id. at 6.
139. See id.
140. GOTTRON & SHEA, supra note 98, at 11; Editorial, Publishing Risky Research, 485
NATURE 5, 5 (2012).
141. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT OR
SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES (NIH GUIDELINES) 24, 24-31 (2013) (discussing the selfregulation of research labs that focus on covering research with recombinant DNA, and the
lack of government oversight as a result).
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Select Agents Regulations in many cases, and in all instances due to the
implications for national security, similar to the significant civil and criminal
penalties for violating the export control laws. Therefore, it is likely that
institutions would want to involve a separate body to make final decisions,
such as a federal entity like NSABB, or another independent entity, but
without giving up complete control at the institutional level.
Many institutions are not planning to review research for DURC potential
due to the current scope of existing or proposed DURC policies, simply
because they do not conduct Select Agents research. This may be imprudent
considering the intent of DURC policies, which makes it likely that their
scope will be expanded in the future. However, a number of institutions have
already implemented institutional-level DURC policies.142 Some institutions
review only research with Select Agents for DURC potential, while others
review all research proposed by and conducted at the institution for
associated DURC risks143 with compiled data from three different IBC
surveys at public and private research institutions, hospitals, and clinics with
response rates ranging from 29.2%–45.1%.144 Over 50% of the
respondents indicated that IBCs reviewed research for potential DURC, and
another 15% considered doing so.145 However, the survey indicated that
only 37% of IBC members were being trained on dual-use risks.146
Considering the sharp rise in the number of IBCs in the U.S. from 397 in
2002, to 799 in 2010,147 and assuming a learning curve for newly formed
IBCs and their members, it is difficult to ascertain whether IBCs across the
U.S. are, in fact, qualified to the extent needed to ensure compliance with
DURC policies for PIs and institutions, especially when DURC review is not
their primary responsibility.
Perhaps sharing the above concerns, some institutions have convened a
committee separate from the IBC to review research involving Select Agents
with DURC potential, but they are a small minority.148 These separate
committees include scientific, medical, security, and safety experts.149
Examples of such committees exist at Boston University and the University of
Wisconsin-Madison.150 At Boston University, the formal review process starts
142. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., supra note 112, at 12-13.
143. Id. at 20.
144. Raymond W. Hackney, Jr. et al., Current Trends in Institutional Biosafety Committee
Practices, 17 APPLIED BIOSAFETY 11, 12 (2012).
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 15.
147. Id. at 12.
148. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., supra note 112, at 20 (this is Boston
University and University of Wisconsin-Madison).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 14-15.
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with the researchers responding to eight specific questions, which are
designed to identify the seven types of experiments of concern.151 In this
regard, this is similar to how proposals are identified as needing export
control review.152 If warranted, the DURC review committee discusses the
research with the PI, and a mitigation plan is designed in consultation with
university officials and with NSABB.153 Because information gained during
the course of any research might raise new questions or concerns regarding
DURC, and to ensure buy-in of its community, Boston University preceded
implementation of its institutional DURC Policy with a preliminary phase,
which has consisted, since 2009, of diligent awareness and an education
program for all research personnel and administrators.154
The University of Wisconsin-Madison has a similar process with a heavy
educational component.155 Identification of research with DURC potential
does not necessarily start with the PI, however, it may also be initiated by
any committee reviewing the research or by a funding agency.156 If such
determination is made, the PI and relevant personnel meet with officials
responsible for Select Agents and Toxins Regulations compliance for
information gathering.157 This information is then forwarded to an IBC
subcommittee to perform another interview with the PI to assess DURC
potential of the research, and write a report to be presented to the entire
IBC.158 The IBC conducts a vote, and if warranted, the report is forwarded to
a separate committee, the Biosafety Task Force, for further discussion and
vote, which includes input from the PI, until a consensus is reached
regarding a mitigation plan.159 This plan is forwarded, along with the review
process, to the funding agency for further guidance.160
Research institutions differ by size, sector, funding sources, scientific
expertise, and interests influencing the type of review and oversight process
that may work best for them. The Boston University and University of
Wisconsin-Madison examples illustrate that each institution should ideally
come up with its own system to review and oversee DURC locally, but also
suggests that best practices would include participation by an entity separate

151. Id. at 14.
152. See id.
153. See AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., supra note 112, at 14.
154. Id.; Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), BOS. UNIV., http://www.bu.edu/orc/initi
atives/durc/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
155. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., supra note 112, at 15.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Policies, Responsbilities, and Procedures, UNIV. OF WI-MADISON, http://www.grad.
wisc.edu/research/policyrp/rcr/index.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
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from the IBC. While these two institutions formed separate committees
internally, we believe that it would be highly beneficial to the research
enterprise in the U.S. and abroad to adhere to a set of best practices, which
would be reviewed on a regular basis by an independent accrediting body,
operating internationally. We base this belief on several reasons. First, such
an entity would be a source of additional expertise for institutions, as well as
a means to ensure consistency in the identification, communication, and
mitigation of those risks associated with DURC. This review body would not
impose additional pressures or burdens on the research community, but
would provide a source of non-punitive, confidential oversight. Furthermore,
such a process would be consistent with the position taken during the WHO
meeting held on February 26-28, 2013, where it was agreed that global
guidance on DURC issues was badly needed.161
There is a precedent in the research community for an independent
accrediting body, which provides accreditation to research institutions
committed to following best practices: the Association for Assessment and
Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care International (AAALAC). AAALAC is
a “private, nonprofit organization that promotes the humane treatment of
animals in science through voluntary accreditation and assessment
programs.”162 Its “purpose is to provide an open, fair, and impartial peerevaluation that results in valuable suggestions and information organizations
can use to improve their programs.”163 To encourage “forthright dialogue
that results” in significant improvements, “AAALAC assures its program
participants that none of the details of their evaluations are made public,”
and it does not share information with the public obtained through the
accreditation process, except regarding whether or not the organization is
accredited.164 “More than 880 companies, universities, hospitals,
government agencies, and other research institutions in 37 countries have
earned AAALAC accreditation,165 demonstrating their commitment” to
excellence and the wide acceptance of this accrediting body. These
institutions volunteer to participate in AAALAC's program, in addition to
complying with the local, state, and federal laws that regulate animal
research.166 Through accreditation, these institutions demonstrate that they
go beyond meeting minimum standards required by law and go the extra
161. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 128, at 6.
162. About AAALAC, ASS’N FOR ASSESSMENT & ACCREDITATION OF LAB. ANIMAL CARE INT’L,
http://www.aaalac.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
163. Accreditation, ASS’N FOR ASSESSMENT & ACCREDITATION OF LAB. ANIMAL CARE INT’L,
http://www.aaalac.org/accreditation/policies.cfm?printPage=1& (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
164. Id.
165. See ASS’N FOR ASSESSMENT & ACCREDITATION OF LAB. ANIMAL CARE INT’L, supra note
161.
166. Id.
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step to implement best practices. The U.S. Government and federal funding
agencies recognize AAALAC accreditation and have different reporting
requirements for institutions that are accredited.
We believe that implementing a system of voluntary accreditation for
research institutions performing research with DURC potential would
maximize compliance with DURC policies and encourage adoption of the
most effective and least burdensome practices. It would also improve the
understanding of DURC issues by individual institutions without increasing
the need for additional regulations. Most importantly, it would demonstrate
a culture of scientific responsibility to the public.

